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8.1 Introduction
Export restrictions are a common practice in the current world trading system.
For instance, some developing countries implemented export taxes and export
restrictions during the recent food crisis (2006–2008). But beyond crisis periods,
export restrictions are, in fact, trade measures that are permanently adopted by some
countries: export taxes implemented by Indonesia on palm oil; by Madagascar on
vanilla, coffee, pepper, and cloves; by Pakistan on raw cotton; by the Philippines on
copra and coconut oil; and by Argentina on crops and meat.
At a first glance, from a mercantilist point of view, it might be difficult to under-
stand why countries implement so many export restrictions. Indeed, policymakers
tend to favor exports and discourage imports. However, a more thorough analysis
revealed several justifications.
In this chapter, we consider these justifications and study how export taxation
may worsen a food crisis. It is important to keep in mind that reducing import duties
may also amplify food crisis and that these policy options form the basis of an
asymmetric game.
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We also focus on institutional aspects and, in particular, why export taxes can
be so easily raised. It appears that countries have a considerably large degree
of freedom when implementing such taxes as the WTO does not prohibit export
taxes and other forms of export restrictions. As stated by Crosby (2008), “general
WTO rules do not discipline Members’ application of export taxes,” but “they can
agree—and several recently acceded countries, including China, have agreed—to
legally binding commitments in this regard.” The Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture only stipulates that, when implementing a new export restriction, a
WTO member must (1) consider the implications of these policies on food security
in importing countries, (2) give notice to the Committee on Agriculture, and (3)
consult with WTO members that have an interest. The agreement does not institute
any penalty for countries ignoring the rules. Restrictive export policies do not
receive much attention from the public or the academic establishment.
Section 8.2 provides the various justifications for export restrictions. Section 8.3
investigates the role of export taxes in worsening a food crisis. Section 8.4 focuses
on the limited institutional role of WTO in the topic of restrictive export policies.
Section 8.5 concludes this chapter.
8.2 Why Do Countries Implement Export Restrictions?
Before discussing the policy justifications for export restrictions, it is noteworthy
that, from a theoretical point of view, export taxes and export quotas are equivalent:
quotas could raise revenue if quota allocations are not issued for free but auctioned
under competitive conditions. However, in the real world, export licenses are given
to domestic producers and do not generate public revenue. Therefore, export taxes
and export quotas are not equivalent in the real world.1
The first justification is the terms-of-trade argument and the desire to increase
export prices. This is perhaps the most important justification from a theoretical
point of view. By restricting its exports, a country that supplies a significant share
of a commodity to the world market may raise the world price of that commodity.
This implies an improvement in that country’s terms of trade. The reasoning behind
this argument is very similar to the optimum tariff argument, which states that, by
implementing a tariff on its imports, a “large” country can significantly decrease
the demand for a commodity that it imports; this therefore leads to a decrease in
the commodity’s world price, which is again an improvement in the terms of trade
(Bickerdike 1906; Johnson 1953).
When considering the final consumption of food products, the second justifi-
cation is food security: export taxes reduce domestic prices. When considering a
food product which is an important commodity in a country’s national consumption
1Let us mention that export quota and export taxes are also not equivalent under retaliation, that
is to say if implemented during a trade war between large countries (see Rodriguez 1974; Tower
1975).
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structure and is also exported, by imposing an export tax, a government creates
a wedge between the world price and the country’s domestic price. This can
lower the final domestic consumption price by reorienting domestic supply toward
the domestic market. Piermartini (2004) cited the Indonesian government as an
example. The Indonesian government frequently imposes export taxes on palm oil
products, in particular on palm cooking oil, as it considers cooking oil an “essential
commodity” for local households. This rationale was often used by governments
during the food crisis of 2006–2008 to justify implementing export taxes and other
forms of export restrictions. Some examples of which are as follows: Bangladesh,
Brazil, Cambodia, China, Egypt, and India implemented restrictive policies on rice
and Argentina, India, and Kazakhstan on wheat. Export restrictions are anticyclical
trade policy instruments: when international prices are high, local consumers are
hurt by high domestic prices; implementing export restrictions decreases local prices
but contributes to the rise of international prices.
The third justification takes into account the existence of intermediate consumers
(firms) of the taxed products in a country. If a raw commodity is exported
and is also used by the local processing industry, imposing export taxes on
this primary commodity indirectly subsidizes the local processing industry by
lowering the domestic price of inputs compared to the commodity’s world price,
which is nondistorted. It has the same mechanism as the previous reason: export
taxation gives local producers more incentive to sell their product domestically.
For example, in Indonesia, an export tax on lumber promoted the development
of the domestic wood-processing industry; the development was judged to be
excessive for environmental reasons as it contributed to the depletion of forests
(World Bank 1998). In 1988, Pakistan imposed an export tax on raw cotton in
order to stimulate the development of the yarn cotton industry. Export taxes on
palm oil are imposed in Indonesia and Malaysia to support the development of
downstream industries (biodiesel and cooking oil; see Amiruddin 2003). According
to this line of reasoning, export taxes may also be applied to a whole value chain
by decreasing the level of taxation along the value chain. This is called differential
export tax (DET) rates: the policy of imposing high export taxes on raw commodities
and low export taxes on processed goods. This policy generates public revenues
and promotes production at the later stages of a value chain. Bouët et al. (2014)
studied the theoretical justification of this trade policy, and then they developed a
partial equilibrium model of the global oilseed value chain and simulated the total
elimination of DETs in Argentina and Indonesia and the independent removal of
export taxes at various stages of production in the two countries. Their estimations
showed that removing export taxes along the entire value chain in Argentina and
Indonesia reduced the local biofuel production; they also point out that the DETs
were implemented to raise public revenues.
The fourth justification is also a “raison d’être” for export taxes. Export taxes
provide a source of revenue to developing countries that have limited capacity to
rely on domestic taxation. This is a second-best argument because the imposition
of lump-sum taxes is a first-best policy (Ramsey 1927; Diamond 1975). It is
noteworthy that only export taxes (and not export quotas) serve this objective.
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As with all trade policy, export taxes may serve the purpose of redistributing
income. This is the fifth justification of this policy instrument combining different
aspects from the three previous arguments. Like import tariffs, export taxes are
measures that imply distribution of income. Here, this is detrimental to domestic
producers of the taxed commodity but benefits domestic consumers and public
revenues.
So we arrive at the first conclusion: export taxes are attractive policy instruments
since they may serve different positive purposes for a government.
This is the reason why export taxes are relatively common in the current global
trading system. Some studies have estimated their importance. Laborde et al. (2013)
used a new detailed global data set on export taxes at the HS6 level and the MIRAGE
global CGE model to assess the impact of export taxes on the world economy.
They found that the average export tax on global merchandise trade was 0.48 %
in 2007, with the bulk of these taxes imposed on energy products. Moreover, the
removal of these taxes would increase global welfare by 0.23 %, a larger figure than
the gains projected by the Doha Round. Both developed and emerging economies,
such as China and India, would gain from removing export taxes. Medium and
small food-importing countries without market power (such as the least-developed
countries) would also benefit from the elimination of export restrictions. The export
taxes implemented by the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States
on their energy sector appear to play a critical role in the overall economic impact
of the removal of these taxes. However, some countries, such as Argentina, would
experience income losses.
In the next section, we focus on using food security as a justification for export
taxation. We show how implementing this policy instrument is a noncooperative
trade policy when food prices are high. During a food crisis, governments of food-
exporting countries are tempted to alleviate high food prices by restricting exports to
encourage local producers to sell food items domestically and decrease local prices.
But in doing so, these countries decrease the food supply on the world markets,
causing world food prices to increase. This worsens the food crisis and is typically
a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy.
But in times of food crisis, restricting exports is not the only noncooperative
trade policy. Food-importing countries are, at the same time, tempted to decrease
domestic food prices by decreasing import duties. In doing so, they increase their
national demand on the world market, reinforcing the upward pressure on world
food prices. This is another noncooperative aspect of trade policies in periods of
food crisis.
The combination of export taxes and reduced import duties increases the upward
pressure on world prices when food prices are high. On the contrary, when world
agricultural prices are low, food-exporting countries may be tempted to decrease
export taxes and food-importing countries to increase import duties. This increases
food supply and reduces food demand on world markets and therefore once again
increases the downward pressure on world prices. It may appear that trade policies
make world markets structurally more volatile.
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8.3 To What Extent Does Export Taxation Amplify Food Price
Volatility?
Economic literature helps to explain why large food-exporting countries implement
export taxes and large food-importing countries implement import duties. The first
reason is terms of trade. Bouët and Laborde (2012) designed a general equilibrium
model of international trade between four countries—two large (1 and 2) and two
small (3 and 4)—which trade the two commodities A (agricultural commodity) and
I (industrial good). Countries 1 and 4 have a comparative advantage in A, while
countries 2 and 3 have a comparative advantage in I. Import duties on the industrial
good are assumed to be bound at 0, which implies that countries 1 and 4 will not
use this policy instrument.
Using this simple framework, it is easy to show that if governments’ objective
is to maximize real income (welfare), the Nash equilibrium is a combination of a
positive import duty in country 2 (the large food-importing country) and a positive
export tax in country 1 (the large food-exporting country), while free trade is the
best policy for both small countries. The results point out that large countries may
manipulate world prices by imposing import duties or export taxes, depending on
their export status. This Nash equilibrium implies a reduction in world real income,
but large countries may benefit by having augmented real income. It is important to
note that an import duty in the large food-importing country tends to decrease the
world price of the agricultural commodity, while an export tax in the large food-
exporting country tends to increase it. If at the Nash equilibrium, the world price
of this commodity is increased, the small food-importing country’s real income is
reduced, while the small food-exporting country’s real income is augmented. This
teaches us that (1) export taxes on agricultural commodity improves terms of trade
of large food-exporting countries and (2) when combined with import duties in large
food-importing countries, world trade is drastically reduced and world real income
is hurt with no policy option for small countries.
Bouët and Laborde (2012) also showed that if a government’s objective is to
achieve stable domestic agricultural goods prices during a food crisis, the best
response is to decrease import taxes for a large food-importing country and to
increase export taxes for a large food-exporting country. Both policies increase the
world price of agricultural goods, thereby hurting a small food-importing country
while increasing a small food-exporting country’s real income.
Consequently, a collective action problem emerges from this simple theoretical
framework: in case of a food price spike, governments which are concerned with
establishing domestic food security and stabilizing domestic food prices are tempted
to reduce import duties on food items if they are food importers and to increase
export taxes on food items if they are food exporters. Both policy reactions tend
to reinforce the increase in food world prices. Martin and Anderson (2012) also
pointed out this inefficiency. Gouel (2014) designed a simple stochastic partial
equilibrium model and concluded that countercyclical trade policies are inefficient
172 A. Bouët and D. Laborde Debucquet
at the global level: these trade policies increase world prices when the prices are
relatively high, while they reduce world prices when the prices are relatively low.2
How much these trade policies amplify world price spikes remains to be known.
In the same paper, Bouët and Laborde (2012) used the MIRAGE model of the world
economy to evaluate this point. The study uses the static version of MIRAGE under
perfect competition with 27 regions and 25 sectors.3 They simulated a demand
shock which led to a 10 % increase of the world wheat price. In the first policy
scenario, countries that are net wheat exporters implement export taxes such that
the real domestic price of wheat is constant. This led to additional export taxes in
the range of 16–25 %. This policy reaction also caused the world wheat price to
increase by 16.8 % rather than 10 %. In the second scenario, countries that are
net wheat importers implemented import taxes (import subsidies are forbidden)
such that the real domestic wheat price remained constant (the domestic price is
not constant if the strategic rigidity—i.e., no import subsidies—is binding). Import
duties are decreased by between 13 and 30 % age points, and the world price of
wheat increased by 12.6 %. If both policy reactions are allowed (increasing export
taxes and reducing import duties without implementing import subsidies), additional
export taxes between 19 and 50 % were implemented, and the world price of wheat
increased by 20.6 %: implementing these trade policies caused the world price to
more than double.
Concerning countries’ national real income, net wheat exporters’ economic wel-
fare is positively affected by the initial shock and their policy response (increasing
export taxes), while that of net wheat importers’ welfare is negatively affected. The
economic welfare of Argentina as well as those of Australia, Canada, and Ukraine
significantly increased under all shocks, in particular under the shock that combines
endogenous export taxes and import tariffs. On the other hand, net wheat importers,
such as Egypt and Eastern Africa, are significantly hurt by these shocks in terms of
real income.
This collective action problem necessitates an institutional response: the next
section examines to what extent the WTO may provide a framework adapted to
discipline these inefficient trade policies.
2In case of food glut on world markets, world prices are relatively low: in the model designed by
Gouel (2014), import duties may be increased in the large food-importing country and export taxes
may be decreased in the large food-exporting country since governments have also an objective of
domestic price smoothing.
3The use of a dynamic version of MIRAGE could open the door for new analyses and new
policy conclusions. In the long term, export restrictions diminish sector profitability and, as such,
may decrease investment in these sectors. This means less supply in following periods of time
with a potentially higher risk of increased domestic price which could lead local governments to
implement new export restrictions. This increases the long-term cost of these policies with the
extreme situation where a net-exporting country turns into a net-importing country.
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8.4 Can Export Restrictions Be Disciplined in the WTO
Framework?
There is a clear trade-off between import duties and export taxes with a double
asymmetry. First, in times of food crisis, export taxes are raised while import
duties are reduced. Second, while increasing export taxes is clearly identified as a
noncooperative policy, it is much more difficult to criticize a country when it reduces
its import duties. However, both policy reactions have the same impact on world
prices, and both policies hurt poor food-importing countries. While reducing import
duties cannot be opposed from an institutional point of view, the policy reaction may
be considered as a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy when analyzed from an economic
perspective.
The literature clearly reflects this dilemma. While Martin and Anderson (2012)
and Bouët and Laborde (2012) underlined that reducing import duties also affects
world price variability, Josling (2014) noted that “such impact : : : [is] : : : likely
minor compared to the positive benefits for domestic consumers. Exporters : : : [are]
also benefiting from the reduction in protection levels and it would therefore not
: : : [make] sense to develop rules that : : : [inhibit] countries from making increased
use of imports when domestic prices are high” (Josling 2014, p. 6). On the contrary,
Gouel (2014) concluded that “export restrictions do not play a more important
role : : : [in recent food price spikes] than tariffs. : : : they both contribute to shift
volatility to partners’ markets” (Gouel 2014, p. 18).4
While the WTO gives its members total freedom to decrease import duties
(even import subsidies are tolerated), the institution forbids the implementation of
quantitative export restrictions (Article X1:1). However, international law makes an
exception for temporary export quotas in times of critical shortages of food items
(Article XI:2). Export taxes are not prohibited, but the WTO requires its members to
consider how their export taxes will affect their trading partners and to notify when
implementing export taxes.
Anania (2014) considered that the provisions concerning export restrictions,
which was included in the agricultural “modalities” issued in December 2008,
reflected a broad agreement on this issue and are not ambitious. He proposed
modifying Article XI.2 by limiting the export prohibitions and restrictions which
are allowed under Article XI to a certain time frame. He wrote: “Existing export
prohibitions and restrictions in foodstuffs and feeds under Article XI.2 (a) of GATT
1994 shall be eliminated by the end of the first year of implementation” and “any
new export prohibitions or restrictions under Article XI.2 (a) of GATT 1994 should
not normally be longer than 12 months, and shall only be longer than 18 months with
the agreement of the affected importing Members.” He also highlighted the need to
4However, Gouel (2014) also concludes that export restrictions may be more damaging in the
real world because of the asymmetry of world price distribution (commodity prices are positively
skewed).
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strengthen the consultation and notification procedures so that they are performed
within 90 days of introducing a new restrictive export measure.
Anania (2014) recommended two options, which he deemed realistic and can
potentially be included in a low-ambition Doha Agreement. First, as proposed
by many other observers, the commitment to shelter noncommercial interventions
from export restrictions made by the G20 at the 2011 Cannes Summit5 needs to
be transformed into a legal commitment at the WTO. Unfortunately, at the 2011
WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva, the proposal6 to adopt this approach at a
multilateral level was opposed by key countries including Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, and South Africa7, which are all G20 members. And without a consensus, the
proposal was not adopted. Even though it is not legally binding, a statement made
during a Ministerial Conference would have been the first step toward the inclusion
of this basic requirement in the final Doha package—avoiding export restrictions
because they adversely affect food aid. Indeed, food purchases by international
organizations concern mainly key staple products and a few processed products for
emergency reasons.8 They represent a limited amount of total worldwide traded
quantities of these food items. Second, making existing disciplines enforceable
essentially involves clarifying the definition of the conditions under which export
quantitative restrictions are allowed. The exact wording of Article XI is imprecise:
“temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party” (Article XI:2a of GATT 1994).
In particular, the words “temporarily” and “critical” need to be clearly defined.
However bringing discipline into the area of export restrictions is a complex issue.
Cardwell and Kerr (2014) adopted a pessimistic view on this issue. They opined
that any disciplinary measures to deal with export taxes would neither be effective
nor have any deterrent effects. Trade disputes, including export restrictions, occur
over a different time frame than the other disputes. Any disputes arising from export
restrictions during a period of high food prices are unlikely to be resolved before the
prohibited restriction is lifted. Moreover, the authors also believed that retaliatory
5“According to the Action Plan, we agree to remove food export restrictions or extraordinary
taxes for food purchased for noncommercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Program
and agree not to impose them in the future.” G20 Cannes Summit, 3–4 November 2011. This
commitment was based on the G20 Action Plan defined on 23 June 2011 and was based on Rec-
ommendation #5 from the international organizations report for the G20 on “Price volatility in food
and agricultural markets: policy responses.” Available at http://www.amis-outlook.org/fileadmin/
templates/AMIS/documents/Interagency_Report_to_the_G20_on_Food_Price_Volatility.pdf.
6The proposal was supported by Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the European Union, Korea,
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Turkey.
7See Bridges, Volume 15-number 37. Available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/117348.
8For instance, the World Food Program, in 2013, procured mainly rice, maize, wheat,
wheat flour, pulses, vegetable oil, sorghum, maize meal, sugar, and blended food. The lat-
ter includes pasta, high-energy biscuits, emergency rations, and ready-to-use supplementary
foods (breast milk supplement)(see http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/
communications/wfp264134.pdf).
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measures are difficult to design; retaliation for an export restriction in a particular
sector should be carried out in another sector, and the retaliation should amount to
the same value as the lost exports. This is likely difficult to implement when there is
great disparity between the countries concerned, such as in the case of trade between
poor net food-importing countries and countries having imposed export restrictions.
8.5 Concluding Remarks: Looking for a Solution
As discussed in Sect. 8.2, export restrictions play an important role in increasing
price volatility and magnifying the impact of natural weather variability on agricul-
tural markets. It greatly contributes to policy uncertainty and therefore undermines
private investments in domestic agricultural supply, and in trade-related infrastruc-
ture and network. The binding process of import tariffs at the WTO was particularly
aimed at reducing this policy instability, creating a more secure environment for the
private sector and fostering investments. At the same time, it limits the possibility
of a retaliation and prevents noncooperative outcomes and the so-called trade wars
from emerging.9 However, the current system is quite asymmetric at the WTO, as
mentioned in Sect. 8.3, while import restrictions are severely dealt with by a set
of disciplinary measures, export restrictions do not face the same constraints. On
the import side, a clear framework is provided by the binding of tariffs (100 % in
agriculture); tariffication and elimination of quantitative import restrictions (GATT
article XI), exceptional conditions notwithstanding; and stringent rules framing the
use of contingent protection (antidumping duties in GATT article 6, safeguards
GATT article 19, etc.). On the export side, only quantitative export restrictions are
currently disciplined, and the policy space to use them remains large, especially
for food products. Because supplier countries do not face similar disciplines, this
asymmetry undermines the pursuit of global integration of agricultural markets,
and it strengthens the arguments of countries that do not want to reduce their
tariffs and increase their reliance on world markets. Indeed, the current framework
provides an unbalanced distribution of risks between importers and exporters, and
it also lets suppliers increase their market power. It could potentially even have
worse consequences: the overall price instability and the asymmetry in disciplinary
measures could lead to the relaxation of disciplinary actions against contingent
9In fact, applying the game theory to trade policy leads to the conclusion that to facilitate the
emergence of cooperation, there is a choice of either institutionalizing a discipline that forbids
noncooperation (a world institution that forbids countries to implement beggar-thy-neighbor trade
policies) or allowing countries to use retaliatory measures to prevent other countries from being
noncooperative. The threat of retaliation is viewed as a powerful means of encouraging cooperation
(see Axelrod 1981; Bouët 1992). The reality of the trading system today lies somewhere between
these two options since the WTO forbids the use of some policy instruments (import duties) but
authorizes the use of others (export restrictions). Moreover, a global institution is necessary since
trading partners differ in size and capacity to hurt other countries.
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import measures, as with the special safeguard mechanism introduced by the G-33,
instead of strengthening regulations on contingent export restrictions.
In this context, it is important to discuss potential solutions by means of new
WTO regulations or experimenting with new concepts found in some bilateral
agreements. Indeed, the elimination of export restrictions can be seen as a first-
best solution, but domestic political economy will make it unrealistic to attain such
outcome in the short run, especially for countries with weak institutions. This is
because these countries will need time to reform their tax system to replace export
taxes by production taxes.
If not at the multilateral level, a solution may be reached at least on a plurilateral
basis.10 Looking at recent bilateral agreements reveals that some of these features
are already included in both North–North and North–South deals. As an example of
a North–North deal, the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA)
between the EU and Canada states its position on restrictive trade policies in certain
terms; Article 7 of the agreement eliminates duties and taxes on exports: “Neither
Party may maintain or institute any duties, taxes or other fees and charges imposed
on, or in connection with, the exportation of goods to the other Party, or any internal
taxes or fees and charges on goods exported to the other Party, that are in excess
of those that would be imposed on those goods when destined for internal sale.”
The Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is
a free trade agreement between the USA, five Central American countries, and the
Dominican Republic. The agreement’s key principle is to bind existing measures,
granting them a “grandfathering” clause, and ban new export taxes (export bans are
still subject to Article XI of the GATT); Article 3.8 of the agreement states: “[ : : : ]no
Party may adopt or maintain any prohibition or restriction on [ : : : ] the exportation
or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of another Party, except in
accordance with Article XI of the GATT 1994.” Article 3.11 indicates clearly that
discriminatory practices are banned: “Export Taxes Except as provided in Annex
3.11, no Party may adopt or maintain any duty, tax, or other charge on the export of
any good to the territory of another Party, unless such duty, tax, or charge is adopted
or maintained on any such good: (a) when exported to the territories of all other
Parties; and (b) when destined for domestic consumption.”
The Economic Partnership Agreement, negotiated between the EU and some
members of the Southern African Development Community (2015), also expresses
its position in firm language while still maintaining some flexibility for the less-
advanced economies. Article 26.1 follows the binding approach: “No new customs
duties or taxes imposed on or in connection with the exportation of goods shall be
introduced, nor shall those already applied be increased, in the trade between the
10If a plurilateral approach on all commodities is not achievable, a commodity-by-commodity
approach following the sectoral initiatives could be considered. The main limit is that for most
of the key staple commodities, one of the major exporters is very defensive regarding export taxes
regulations (e.g., Russia, Argentina, and India on wheat).
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Parties from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, except as otherwise
provided for in this Article.” Article 26:2 recognizes that “In exceptional circum-
stances, [ : : : ] where essential for the prevention or relief of critical general or local
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to ensure food security Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique and Swaziland may introduce, after consultation
with the EU, temporary customs duties or taxes imposed on or in connection with
the exportation of goods, on a limited number of additional products.” So, in this
agreement, the largest economies (South Africa, the EU) have strong commitments
to fulfill, while the others benefit from a special and differentiated treatment.
Sections 6–10 of Article 26 provide an interesting framework for how to prevent
products exempted from export taxes from being reexported to third parties on a
bilateral basis.
So, what can be done, especially in the context of restricting contingent,
short-term export restrictions? As previously discussed, humanitarian interventions
should be shielded from these measures in any basic WTO decisions, but attempts to
change international laws have faced strong opposition. In this context, the first basic
step is to enforce a strong monitoring and notifications process,11 aimed at reducing
asymmetry of information. To keep both private and public agents informed, there
are ongoing efforts to create agricultural market information systems aimed at
providing updated policy changes for key agricultural commodities not only at the
WTO but also at the G20, with its AMIS initiative.12 However, the lack of automatic
sanctions when countries fail to notify, which is a larger issue facing the WTO
than export restrictions, is still a major problem. The second step is to develop a
system that focuses on protecting small and vulnerable economies (SVEs). SVEs
are generally more open and have lower income, poorer consumers, and no capacity
to retaliate. Also, their demand, even when aggregated, cannot be considered as a
major driver of global price increase. To ensure healthy global trade, protecting these
countries and limiting negative externalities coming from other larger countries
should be prioritized.
A natural way to address this issue is the “reversed” tariff quota approach. For
normal import levels (e.g., the average bilateral import volume in the last 3 years),
SVEs should be able to import food products without quantitative restrictions and
additional export taxes. This would guarantee normal market access conditions
even when world market turmoil causes major traders to change their policies.
Beyond the “historical” level of imports, exporters would be free to apply short-
term restrictions.
11This issue was emphasized in the WTO agricultural committee meeting on 21 June 2011: “These
require the restricting country to take into account the impact on importing countries’ food security,
to notify the WTO as soon as possible, and as far in advance as possible, to be prepared to discuss
the restriction with importing countries and to supply them with detailed information when asked
for it.”
12http://www.amis-outlook.org/home/en/
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Another solution is to replace rigid legislation by a price mechanism and to
apply a Pigouvian tax on the negative externalities of short-term surges in export
restrictions. When a country, at least a G20 country, implements a new export
restriction on food products, it would have to pay a fee. If more sophisticated pricing
rules can be developed, a first approximation could be the historical amount of taxes
collected from goods imported by an SVE from this exporter. The automaticity
of the payment is ensured by the effective revenue collected by the exporting
countries13 and will address the key problems of (1) a lengthy dispute settlement at
the WTO and (2) the lack of retaliation capacity by the SVE. The income generated
through collecting this fee could be directly channeled toward helping SVEs pay
their surging food import bills and fund their emergency safety nets. Alternatively,
the income could also be used to provide the World Food Program with extra
resources so that the program can cope with an increase in world food prices
and develop targeted interventions. Similarly, a market for authorizing quantitative
restrictions (like the “permits to pollute”) can allow exporters to restrict their export
quantities, while SVEs would have “importing rights” calculated based on historical
import levels and could sell these licenses to exporters, thereby generating income
to cover their import bills. These different measures are designed to provide an
international insurance mechanism against harmful policies by reducing incentives
to implement them (additional costs to exporters) and providing remedies for the
most vulnerable countries.
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